Unleashing the Furies

 

In 2015, the Obama administration negotiated an agreement with Iran which resulted in the regulation and reduction of that nation’s nuclear program capable of producing weapons‑grade material in exchange for sanctions relief. Specifically, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) plan was concluded by the governments of the U.S., China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, coordinated by the European Union. It resulted in a significant reduction of Iran’s ability to enrich uranium and sharply limited the amount of enriched material it was permitted to retain. It also established strict monitoring of its nuclear activities.

 The agreement had the objective of extending that nation’s “breakout” time from a few months to a year before they would reach capacity to acquire the material and technical capability to build a nuclear weapon should the agreement be broken. At the time of the deal, Iran possessed a uranium stockpile that, if further enriched, could have yielded enough fissile material for roughly 8–10 nuclear weapons — a stockpile the JCPOA reduced by about 97%. The JCPOA was far from perfect, but it did place significant controls on Iran’s nuclear capability. It also had the advantage of reinforcing an international consensus among partners and adversaries to further stabilize the agreement.

 The critique from the Republican Party was fierce, but largely reactive, which, in minimizing the importance of reducing Iran’s nuclear program, did not seem to appreciate the significance the actual specifications of the agreement. The JCPOA was designed to remain in effect for 10-15 years which would have kept Iran’s nuclear capability severely restricted throughout much of that period.

 In 2018, President Trump removed the U.S. from the JCPOA and set off an increasingly confrontative stance toward Iran. In viewing the agreement as effectively over in response to Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, Iran began to revamp its nuclear program. In sacrificing the good for some maximum pressure campaign, the president’s nihilistic instincts dissolved a workable but imperfect deal for nothing of constructive value that was put in its place.

 Clearly, Iran has been a problem. Their ongoing backing of terrorist groups throughout the Middle East during the past eight years and their support of Russia’s military efforts in its war against Ukraine would have made any revision of the JCPOA exceedingly problematic—especially for the Biden administration— matters that the initial agreement was not deigned to tackle. In principle, these issues could have been addressed in a revamped agreement through a discerning carrot/stick approach—an orientation that was largely missing in Trump’s singularly focused “maximum pressure” stance.

 Iran’s brutal crackdown resulting in the deaths of thousands of protestors in that beleaguered country during the first two months of this year was an outrage of highest magnitude. While Trump declared that the U.S. would intervene in some capacity to support the protestors, such assistance was not forthcoming. That aside, working out of a singular confrontative stance throughout the first 13 months of his second term, the Trump administration continued to press on its stated policy of maximum pressure toward Iran.

 How this U.S. and Israeli initiated war becomes resolved remains to be seen. While it’s conceivable it could work out for the better, there is a distinct possibility that in unleashing the furies, Trump set in place a set of severe economic and political ruptures of the first order, which is a high price to pay for a war of choice with no imminent threat warranted to provoke it. Among much else, what remains unclear is whether the U.S. objective is that of permanently eliminating Iran’s nuclear capability, gaining control of that nation’s oil fields, or seeking a broader regime change. These are maximal goals in their own varied ways.  Each requires distinct policy strategies in how they would be carried out in the political, economic, international, and military spheres, all of which would likely require boots on the ground.

 What is evident is that in leaving the JCPOA and enacting a policy of “maximum pressure,” Trump played a major role in unleashing the crisis, which, as he contends, only he alone can resolve, even as it remains unclear what specifically provoked this war of choice as well as the uncertainty as to the end game.  According to his press secretary, Trump “had a feeling based on facts” that taking on this war was the right thing to do in view of what the president contended was an immanent attack by Iran on U.S. assets in the Middle East and the prospect of rebuilding their nuclear weapons program. As he asserted, “they were going to attack first, I felt strongly about that” (NPR, 3-4-2026). Evidence to back up his claims was not forthcoming.

 One thing we do know; when asked to discuss how he makes decisions on issues related to the international arena, he referred to his own morality, as his ultimate arbiter of public authority—in his words, “my own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me” (New York Times, 1-10-2026). As Trump assured us, the war will end “when I feel it… in my bones.”

 I submit that we need a far broader frame of reference for establishing a sound foreign policy, especially for a nation as consequential as the United States of America.